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Over the last decade, consumers have tripled their use of credit cards as more merchants have
increased their acceptance of them.  This increase suggests that incentives in today’s marketplace
favor greater credit card use by consumers and acceptance by merchants.  In this paper, we study
the set of interrelated bilateral transactions in credit card networks.  First, we survey the recent
theoretical papers using this approach and find that there is a lack of consensus regarding the
optimal set of pricing policies.  Second, we explore each of these interrelated transactions
emphasizing common market practices and the underlying regulatory and legal framework.
Third, we analyze the impact of certain credit card market practices on competing payment
instruments such as debit cards.
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 I. Introduction
The usage of third-party general-purpose credit cards in the United States has increased
dramatically over the last decade.
1  Credit cards have surpassed checks as the most frequently
used payment instrument at the point of sale and are the primary payment instrument for Internet
transactions.  From 1990 to 1999, credit card transactions more than tripled from 4.6 billion to
14.2 billion in the United States.  Dollar volume increased from $337 billion to $1,096 billion
over the same period (Credit Card News, 2000).
Although there are thousands of different financial institutions that issue credit cards,
they usually participate in one of four major credit card networks operated by American Express,
Discover, MasterCard or Visa.
2  The two largest networks—MasterCard and Visa—accounted
for over 75 percent of the dollar volume in 1999.  American Express and Discover operate their
own “proprietary” networks, whereas Visa and MasterCard are credit card associations
comprised of member banks.
Recently, some market participants have argued that the lack of competition at the
network level may lead to unusually high rents.  In this article, we will discuss two antitrust
cases against Visa and MasterCard.
3  In the first case, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ)
claims that Visa and MasterCard through various policies limit competition in the credit card
market.  The three main policies being questioned are: exclusivity—member banks issuing Visa
and MasterCard products are not allowed to issue products from other credit card networks,
                                                            
1 This article focuses only on general-purpose credit cards.  Retailer-issued charge and credit cards preceded both
general-purpose charge and credit cards in the United States.  However, today general-purpose cards account for 5.5
times as many transactions and over nine times the total dollar value of retailer-issued cards excluding gas and
telephone cards (Nilson, 1999, 6-7).
2 Although primarily known for its charge card products, American Express also issues credit cards known as
Optima and Blue cards.  Unlike credit card balances, charge card balances must be paid completely at the end of the
billing cycle.
3 There is also a new lawsuit against the two card associations concerning the proper disclosure of foreign exchange
transaction fees.2
duality—Visa and MasterCard cards can be issued by the same financial institution, and
corporate governance—members of one association have significant influence in the other
association.  In the second antitrust case, the National Association of Retailers along with several
large retailers claims that Visa and MasterCard use illegal tying arrangements to force retailers to
accept all of their payment card products.  Specifically, merchants are not currently allowed to
decline Visa and MasterCard offline debit cards while accepting the associations’ credit cards.
4
To better understand credit card antitrust issues, the underlying bilateral relationships in
credit card networks are explored to investigate if any participant benefits or is harmed by
various incentives existing in today’s marketplace.  Recently, the overall effects of some pricing
practices at the network level have been questioned.  Some analysts have argued that the
common practice of charging one price regardless of payment instrument used distorts the
allocation of goods and services in the economy.  These analysts argue that users of less
expensive payment instruments subsidize credit card users.  Others have argued that charging
different prices would not necessarily benefit all consumers.
While there may be substantial competition in the issuer and acquirer markets, some
analysts question the setting of interchange fees by the network operators.  The interchange fee is
the lower bound for the merchant discount, the fee merchants are charged for their credit card
sales.  DOJ’s antitrust case against MasterCard and Visa questions the competitive forces that
exist among the two associations and in the credit card industry as a whole.
Whether the credit card market is competitive or whether certain participants are able to
earn excessive rents is debatable.  However, technological improvements in payment
technologies may reduce transactions costs for all participants.  Specifically, when online debit
                                                            
4 Offline debit cards are processed via credit card networks as opposed to ATM networks used for online debit cards
and are significantly more expensive than their online cousins.3
cards are used, the time lag between when a payment is made and when it is converted into good
funds has essentially been eliminated.  If credit card customers do not require an extension of
credit when they make purchases, their use of the less expensive and less risky online debit cards
may improve overall welfare.
5  However, incentives in today’s marketplace may lead consumers
to use more expensive alternatives when less expensive ones exist.
This article is organized as follows.  In the next section, credit card networks are
described.  In section III, the consumer-issuer relationship is investigated.  In section IV, the
pricing of credit card transactions by merchants at the point of sale is discussed.  The relationship
between the merchant and its acquirer is explored in section V.  In section VI, the relationship
between the issuer and the acquirer is discussed.  Competition at the network level is investigated
in section VII.  Finally, in section VIII, some conclusions are drawn.
II. Credit Card Networks
There are usually five participants in a credit card transaction—the consumer, the
consumer’s bank (also known as the issuer), the merchant, the merchant’s bank (also known as
the acquirer), and a credit card network such as American Express, Discover, MasterCard or
Visa.
6  In figure 1, the set of bilateral transactions that occur in a credit card transaction are
diagrammed.  Prior to making a credit card purchase, the consumer is granted a line of credit
from a financial institution.  In most cases, before the merchant accepts the credit card for
payment, it requests authorization from the credit card network.  If the transaction is approved,
the merchant receives the funds usually within 48 hours.  The network credits the acquirer’s
                                                            
5 A change from the status quo is defined to be welfare improving if all participants are at least as well off and some
are better off.
6 In the case of American Express and Discover, the issuer, the acquirer, and the network operator are the same
entity.4
account and debits the issuer’s account.
7  Finally, the issuer sends the consumer a bill for all the
purchases made during a given period.
8
In figure 2, the main costs incurred by each participant are diagrammed.  When
establishing an account with an issuer, the consumer may be charged an annual fee and will face
finance charges if the bill is not paid in full every month.  In today’s marketplace, merchants
generally charge the same price regardless of the payment instrument used.  The merchant
receives a discounted value for its credit card receipts from its acquirer.  The acquirer is charged
an interchange fee by the issuer.
Most of the academic literature on credit cards has focused on certain sections of the
credit card network instead of the set of interrelated transactions.  However, a multi-market
approach to studying the credit card market is developing.  Such models are critical in
understanding how each bilateral relationship affects others in the system.  Baxter (1983),
Chakravorti and Emmons (2001), Chakravorti and To (1999), Rochet and Tirole (2000),
Schwartz and Vincent (2000), and Wright (2000) model the set of transactions to investigate the
incentives for each participant to use the credit card network.  Baxter suggests that side payments
may be necessary to adequately compensate certain participants.  The other papers extend upon
Baxter and have varying conclusions based on their underlying assumptions.
Assuming competitive markets, Chakravorti and Emmons suggest that consumers that
revolve balances pay for the credit card system.  They find that allowing merchants to price
discriminate based on the underlying cost of the payment instrument used would improve
welfare by eliminating a cross-subsidy from revolvers to convenience users.  Their result
                                                            
7 Transactions are usually netted among issuers and acquirers and one amount is debited or credited at the end of the
day.
8 Often, credit card transactions involve additional participants.5
assumes a comparable payment instrument offering similar benefits for convenience users and
merchants where there is no short-term lending of funds to make purchases.
9
Chakravorti and To assume a continuum of monopolist merchants selling different goods
to consumers that have random incomes and expenditures in each period.  They assume the
monopolist issuer also serves as the acquirer and network operator.
10  Because merchants have
little bargaining power, the issuer is able to fully extract rents on additional sales resulting from
credit card acceptance.  Given a relatively low probability of future sales to repeat customers, a
prisoner’s dilemma situation arises where each merchant chooses to accept credit cards but when
all merchants accept credit cards, they are worse off.  They also find that the ability to charge a
higher fee is dependent on the number of liquidity-constrained consumers delivered by the
issuer.
Schwartz and Vincent assume monopolist merchants and a monopolist issuer that also
serves as the acquirer and the network operator.  They assume that the proportion of card and
cash users are exogenously set.  If cardholder rebates are infeasible, a one-price policy can
reduce card transactions as well as cash transactions.
11  They study the surplus-shifting between
card and non-card users.  They conclude that although overall surplus can increase or decrease
with a one-price policy, total consumer surplus always falls with a one-price policy.
Rochet and Tirole construct a model using Hotelling competition where two merchants
lie at the endpoints of a line and consumers are evenly distributed on the line.  Both consumers
and merchants receive benefits set exogenously.
12  They find under certain conditions that a one-
price rule leads to greater provision of credit card services because merchants’ resistance to card
                                                            
9 They assume all consumers have access to credit cards and cash.
10 They also assume that there exists a payment alternative to credit cards that offers similar electronic transfer of
funds with minimal or zero settlement risk for the merchant but does not extend interest-free credit to consumers.6
acceptance is lowered.  If price discrimination is allowed, the level of the interchange fee no
longer affects the level of credit card services provided regardless of how the interchange fee is
set.
Wright considers three market structures—monopolistic, competitive, and Hotelling.
Similar to Rochet and Tirole, he assumes that consumers and merchants receive benefits from
credit card use that are exogenously determined.  For monopolistic markets, he finds a one-price
environment is generally welfare improving and regulating interchange fees is probably
inefficient.  Furthermore, he shows that allowing merchants to price discriminate leads to
merchants extracting the consumer surplus resulting in no consumers willing to join the credit
card network for a positive fee.  For competitive markets, he finds that allowing price
discrimination does not reduce or increase welfare because two types of merchants would
result—those that accept credit cards and those that do not.  Similar to Rochet and Tirole, Wright
finds that under Hotelling competition with price discrimination leads to under provision of
credit card services.  He also finds that the optimal interchange fee is rarely zero.
The academic literature does not provide a consistent view on the optimal bilateral
pricing decisions.  The different conclusions are based on a different set of assumptions.  Future
research should consider close payment substitutes for liquid credit card consumers such as debit
cards using automated teller networks.  Such substitutes may be underused by consumers
because of incentives to use credit cards.  Furthermore, empirical work that provides an
integrated approach to studying the payment card networks in general should be encouraged.
We next turn to analyzing each of the bilateral relationships outlined above.
                                                                                                                                                                                                   
11 In this context, a one-price policy exists when merchants do not charge different prices based on the payment
instrument used to make the purchase.  We discuss such policies in Section IV.7
III. The Issuer-Consumer Relationship
U.S. consumers can choose from over 6,000 issuers.  Credit card services offered to
consumers are bundled and competition exists on several dimensions (see Evans and
Schmalensee 1999, Table 7.1, 142-3).  Although the issuing market is fairly concentrated with
the top 10 issuers accounting for over three-quarters of total credit card outstanding balances,
many new entrants along with existing issuers continue to offer new and innovative services to
consumers (see figure 3 for the top ten issuers).  Thus, the market for issuers seems to be fairly
competitive and contestable.
Both revolvers and convenience users benefit from credit card use.  Revolvers,
consumers that do not payoff their credit card balances in full each month, use credit cards as a
source of long-term credit lasting more than a month.  In addition to the credit component, both
revolvers and convenience users enjoy various benefits for using credit cards such as extended
guarantees and warranties on their purchases, dispute resolution services, car rental and travel
insurance, and frequent-use awards.
The interest rate charged for credit card loans has received substantial attention in the
academic literature.  Unlike other consumer loans, credit card loans are usually uncollateralized
and therefore more risky than other consumer loans such as mortgages and car loans.  In the past,
credit card rates remained high even when other consumer loan rates declined (see figure 4).
Several economists have attempted to explain this stickiness.  Ausbel (1991) argues that the
issuing business is not competitive because of the persistence of abnormal profits.  He along with
Calem and Mester (1995) suggest that there is adverse selection whereby lowering interest rates
would attract a disproportionate amount of low-quality borrowers.  On the other hand, Brito and
Hartley (1995) argue that credit card rates are not high when compared to other low-value
                                                                                                                                                                                                   
12 They assume consumers pay annual fees to carry credit cards and do not consider the credit aspect of credit cards.8
consumer loans.  Evans and Schmalensee (1993 and 1999) argue that long-run credit card profits
are not abnormally high.  Chakravorti and Emmons suggest that finance charges to revolvers
may capture other costs besides default risk.
More recent evidence suggests that competition has increased in the issuing business.
Issuers such as Bank of New York, the Advanta Corporation and AT&T introduced more
attractive fees to consumers including the elimination of annual fees.
13  In 1999, issuers
competed intensely on interest rates with average interest rates at 15.21 percent.  Many issuers
were offering introductory rates of 9.99 percent or lower (Credit Card News, February 15, 1999).
The other type of credit card consumers, convenience users—those that payoff their
balances every month—benefit from interest-free short-term loans along with other card benefits
extended to revolvers described above.  Unlike revolvers that pay finance charges, convenience
users do not often pay for these services.
14  According to the Federal Reserve Board survey of
credit cards (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2000), 63 percent of issuers did
not charge an annual fee.  As a result, convenience users are sometimes referred to as deadbeats
or freeloaders in the industry implying that they are not profitable to issuers.  According to
CardWeb.com, convenience use has gone up from 29 percent in 1991 to 44 percent in 1999
(Weber and Palmer, 2000).  If there are real resource costs to credit card purchases made by
convenience users, these costs are paid by other participants in the credit card network.
Generally, for issuers to break even on convenience users, these consumers would need to make
$3,000 of purchases annually (Crenshaw, 1997).
15
                                                            
13 AT&T and Advanta have since left the credit card industry.   In 1997, AT&T and Advanta sold their credit card
portfolios to Citibank and Fleet Bank, respectively (Evans and Schmalensee, 1999).
14 We assume that these consumers do not take cash advances either.  Unlike purchases, cash advances generally do
not have grace periods.
15 This figure is based on certain assumptions about the cost of funds to issuers, fraud rates, merchant discounts and
other factors.9
 Due to lower profits from an increase in convenience users and chargeoffs, issuers have
started to increase various fees (see figure 5 for chargeoff rates).  In 1998, late and over-the-limit
fee income increased 23 percent from the year before (Daly, 1999). In addition, some issuers
began to increase annual fees, cash advance fees, and certain punitive rates.
 Issuers also reduced their grace periods for payments.  In the 1980s, cardholders had an
average of 25- to 30-day grace periods if the preceding month’s bill was paid in full (Tolken,
1999).  The Federal Reserve Survey of Credit Card Plans (Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, 2000) found less than 12 percent of the issuers offered grace periods greater
than 25 days and three issuers offered no grace period.  Some issuers have also become stricter
about the imposition of late fees, which are now charged immediately after the grace period
ends.  A few years ago, most issuers allowed a couple of extra days after the due date before
imposing late fees (Credit Card News, February 1, 1999).  Another strategy used by issuers is to
segment cardholders by different grace periods where convenience users would have fewer days,
while revolvers that pay daily interest charges would have more days.
Some issuers cancelled credit cards of consumers that did not revolve balances.
Beneficial National Bank, which issues credit cards with BJ’s Wholesale Club, dropped about
12,000 cardholders in 1997 because they had paid their balances in full every month for the
preceding 12 months.  BJ’s sued the issuer, and in the subsequent out-of-court settlement, the
cardholders were reinstated with the condition that they would carry a minimum balance at some
point during the year or pay a $30 annual fee (Crenshaw, 1997).
Thousands of issuers compete on various dimensions such as finance charges, frequent-
use rewards, discounts, and various fees.  Therefore, significant risk-adjusted long-term rents
would likely be absent given the free entry and exit from the issuing business.  Some analysts10
have argued that convenience users and sometimes revolvers are subsidized by other participants
(Chakravorti and Emmons, and Schwartz and Vincent). Future research should investigate if
economic efficiency improves when each participant in the credit card network is charged at
least the marginal cost of the services used.  In the next section, the ability of merchants to
recover credit card costs directly from credit card consumers is explored.
IV.  Consumer-to-Merchant Pricing
The decision by most merchants not to charge higher prices to their credit card customers
seems puzzling because merchants generally face higher costs to process credit card transactions.
According to a survey of supermarkets in 1997, the average cost for a credit card transaction was
$1.07 compared to 45 cents for checks and 29 cents for online debit cards (Food Marketing
Institute, 1998).  If credit cards cost more to accept, why do merchants charge the same price for
credit card purchases?
Merchants accept credit cards because they expect that their profits would be lower if
they did not.  In a survey of merchants, 58 percent thought that their profits would increase by
accepting credit cards (Ernst and Young, 1996).  By accepting charge and credit cards,
merchants may be able to attract customers away from merchants that do not accept them.
16
Merchants are also able to make sales to liquidity-constrained consumers without being directly
exposed to the consumer’s default risk.  Furthermore, merchants may face less risk of acquiring
good funds when accepting credit cards than checks, the most common form of noncash payment
in the United States.
                                                            
16 For a historical perspective on why merchants started to accept charge and credit cards see: Baxter (1983),
Chakravorti (2000), Evans and Schmalensee (1993) and (1999), Mandell (1990), and Nocera (1994).11
Some economists have modeled why merchants accept credit cards.  Murphy and Ott
(1977) suggest that merchants absorb some of the costs of credit card use in order to price
discriminate among consumers.  Chakravorti and To suggest that merchants accept credit cards
to increase their sales.  Evans and Schmalensee (1999), and Rochet and Tirole argue that
merchants that did not accept credit cards would lose customers to those that did.
However, there is lack of consensus whether credit card customers should pay the same
price as cash customers.  Chakravorti and Emmons suggest that when issuers, acquirers,
networks, and merchants operate in competitive markets, all credit card consumers should be
charged higher prices from merchants that accept credit cards.  Schwartz and Vincent find that
while overall welfare can increase or decrease with a one-price policy, total consumer surplus
always falls.  On the other hand, assuming imperfect markets, Rochet and Tirole, and Wright
suggest that consumers may benefit from one-price policies.
The issue of credit card surcharges has a long legislative and regulatory history.
17  The
1969 Truth in Lending Act (TILA) requires credit providers to supply borrowers with
standardized information on the cost of credit to allow consumers to make comparisons among
different creditors.  Initially, TILA treated any difference between cash and credit prices as a
credit cost subject to disclosure rules.  Thus, merchants had to translate the price difference into
an annual percentage rate finance charge at the point of sale.  Because this additional finance
charge may have violated the usury laws of some states at the time, merchants and issuers were
reluctant to implement prices based on payment instruments used.
In October 1974, Congress amended TILA to enable merchants to offer incentives to
those consumers using cash.  The amendments were included in the Fair Credit Billing Act of
                                                            
17 For details, see Barron, Staten and Umbeck (1992), Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (1983),
Kitch (1990), and Lobell and Gelb (1981).12
1974, and specifically outlawed issuers from prohibiting cash discounts.  At the time, Congress
concluded that cash customers were subsidizing credit customers through overall price increases
because merchants faced higher costs with credit cards.  The amendments prevented issuers from
contractually prohibiting merchants from offering cash discounts and exempting cash discounts
of up to five percent from TILA disclosure laws.
In 1976, Congress responded to a request for clarification from the Federal Reserve on
whether Congress had intended special treatment to be applied to both cash discount and credit
card surcharge pricing systems.  Although economically there is no difference between a cash
discount and a credit card surcharge, Congress decided that a discount was not equivalent to a
surcharge and prohibited the imposition of surcharges until February 1979.  A U.S. Senate report
offers the following justification:
By permitting only cash discounts, the Committee intends to assure that consumers will be seeing
at least the highest possible price they will have to pay when they see a tagged or posted price.  In
other words, consumers cannot be lured into an establishment on the basis of the “low, rock-
bottom price” only to find at the cash register that the price will be higher if a credit card is used
(Kitch, 1990, 227 citing U.S. Senate, 1981, 4).
Additionally, Congress ruled that discounts offered for cash purchases would not be considered
credit charges under any state usury or disclosure laws and also extended the surcharge
prohibition until February 1981.
In 1981, the provision was altered again through the Cash Discount Act, which reduced
requirements and limits on the amount of discount.  The act also extended the ban on surcharges
until 1984.  Congress let the ban on surcharges expire in 1984 because of the varying nature of
merchant costs and pricing (U.S. Congress, 1981).  At the time, Congress considered an
extension of the ban and an exemption of TILA requirements for credit card surcharges but both
failed to pass (Kitch, 1990).13
Currently, a provision of Federal Reserve Regulation Z allows all merchants to offer
discounts to their non-credit card consumers but is silent on the issue of credit card surcharges.
However, surcharges are not exempt from TILA disclosure rules resulting in few merchants
imposing them.  Furthermore, some states established their own credit card surcharge laws.  In
1999, the states that specifically prohibited merchants from imposing credit card surcharges were
California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts, New York,
Oklahoma, and Texas.  The remaining states either allowed merchants to impose surcharges on
credit card purchases or did not have laws prohibiting such practices.
Examples of price discrimination at the point of sale based on payment instrument used is
rare in today’s marketplace.  There exists anecdotal evidence of both surcharges and discounts
based on the payment instrument used.  One small merchant in Chicago recently offered a 20
percent discount for cash purchases.  According to the merchant, the cash discount was used as a
marketing tool to attract more customers.  Some merchants in California impose surcharges for
online debit card transactions.  These charges are usually around 25 cents.  However, California
merchants are prohibited from imposing credit card surcharges.  Additionally, issuers may
discount purchases made at certain stores or offer free goods or services if their card is used in
addition to existing frequent-use awards.   
The major exception to the practice of charging the same price regardless of the payment
instrument used occurred at gasoline stations in the eighties when both cash and charge prices
were explicitly posted.  Barron, Staten, and Umbeck found that gas stations that charged a single
price to all consumers charged a higher price to cash consumers than gas stations that price
discriminated based on cash or credit.  They found that gas station operators imposed such
policies when their credit card processing costs were high.  In the late 1970s, credit issuers began14
to see a rapid rise in the cost of financing, as short-term interest rates escalated and peaked in
1982.  In 1985, credit card processing costs began to drop rapidly in the gasoline market, due to
new technology such as electronic terminals at the point of sale.  As a result, cash discounts
became less and less prominent, and by 1991, only two major gasoline retailers were still
offering discounts.
However, credit card associations continue to prohibit surcharges in the United States.
18
Visa and MasterCard’s policies state that merchants who choose to accept their products may not
impose a credit card surcharge.  Economic models investigating welfare implications of a one-
price policy differ depending on the underlying market structure of retailers, acquirers, and
issuers.  The fact that most merchants do not price discriminate when they are allowed to offer
discounts may indicate that they do not prefer a two-price approach.  If merchants are unable or
unwilling to price discriminate and financial institutions provide greater incentives to use credit
cards than other payment forms, consumers should always use their credit cards to make
purchases and pay their balances in full each month (Chakravorti, 1997).
V.  Merchant-to-Acquirer Pricing
Today, the top 10 MasterCard and Visa acquirers account for over three-quarters of their
U.S. transaction volume (for the top ten acquirers by transaction volume, see figure 6).  The next
15 processors together account for close to 13 percent and the remaining account for a little over
ten percent (Credit Card News, 2000).
Initially, charge and credit cards were marketed to merchants as tools to increase their
sales and profits.  Credit cards also appealed to small merchants that granted credit to their
customers directly because they could outsource their finance departments to issuers.  However,15
large department store chains did not immediately accept third-party credit cards because they
preferred to issue their own credit cards.
In 1958, Bank of America established the first general-purpose credit card, Visa’s
predecessor, and set the merchant discount at six percent.  The six-percent merchant discount
lasted many years.  Merchant discount rates today are bilaterally negotiated between acquirers
and merchants and depend on the merchant’s business type, monthly card sales volume and
average transaction amount.
19  Greater competition in the acquiring business led to decreases in
merchant discount rates across the board.  Today, merchant discount fees generally range from
1.25 percent to 3 percent.
Merchants have protested against what they consider high merchant discount fees and
have been successful in reducing fees.  For example, more than 250 Boston restaurants
threatened to stop accepting the American Express card during the “Boston Fee Party” in 1991
(Evans and Schmalensee, 1999, ch. 8).  Merchants were not convinced that sales volume created
through the card’s acceptance justified discount rates that averaged more than 3.25 percent
versus an average of 2 percent for Visa and MasterCard.  Initially, American Express refused to
lower its merchant discount rate claiming that its clients were more affluent high-spending ones.
However, in the end, American Express began to offer more competitive pricing and reduced
fees.  By 1992, its worldwide average discount rate was lowered to 3.1 percent; by 1998, it had
dropped to 2.74.  Thus, merchant pressure was effective in changing pricing policy.
Today, American Express still charges higher discount rates than Visa, MasterCard or
Discover although the gap has narrowed considerably (Punch, 1998).  Because American
                                                                                                                                                                                                   
18 Rochet and Tirole state that MasterCard and Visa prohibit surcharges and discounts in Europe.
19 In cases where merchant discounts are prohibited, issuers may charge usage fees to their cardholders.  For
example, American Express charges 2.5 percent for their customers that use their Delta SkyMiles credit card to pay
their taxes primarily because the IRS cannot legally pay any processing fees (Washington Post, 2001).16
Express is primarily a charge-card issuer, its revenue is primarily composed of merchant
discounts and annual fees unlike credit card issuers that also earn revenue from finance charges
(see figure 7).
20  Given that American Express charges on average a higher merchant discount,
why would merchants accept the card?  When we asked a large retailer why it recently started to
accept American Express cards, it responded that its increase in sales volume and profits more
than offset the additional cost of accepting them.
Theoretical models of credit cards usually explicitly or implicitly assume the market for
acquirers to be competitive.  Anecdotal evidence from large merchants and merchants operating
in very competitive industries suggests that merchant discounts are often very close to
interchange rates implying relatively little markup.  In the next section, we discuss the setting of
interchange fees.
VI. The Acquirer-Issuer Relationship
For MasterCard and Visa credit card transactions, acquirers pay issuers interchange fees.
As mentioned before, American Express and Discover transactions do not have interchange fees
because these systems are three-party systems where the issuer and the acquirer are the same
entity.
21  Interchange fees partially compensate issuers for card marketing costs, cost of funds for
the initial grace period, default risk and various card enhancements (for a broader discussion, see
Bayer, 1999 and Hisey, 1999).
Interchange fees are determined based on the type of merchant, whether the customer is
present, and if the merchant uses an electronic processing system.  These fees are set at the
                                                            
20 Evans and Schmalensee (1999) estimate that 87 percent of American Express charge volume in 1997 occurred on
their charge cards.17
network level (see figure 8).  Standard paper-based transactions have the highest interchange fees
at 2.3 percent plus 10 cents for each Visa transaction and 2.65 percent plus 10 cents for each
MasterCard transaction.  The lowest credit card interchange rate for Visa is for supermarket
transactions that are set at 1.2 percent whereas MasterCard has the lowest interchange fee for
warehouse clubs set at 1.1 percent (Hisey).
Interchange fees effectively set a price floor for merchant discount fees.  In a competitive
acquiring market, the merchant discount rates would be expected to be close to interchange fees.
Industry experts estimate the interchange fee to account for about 67 percent to close to 100
percent of the merchant discount.  Thus, any increase in the interchange fee would most likely
lead to an increase in merchant discount.
A higher interchange fee may lead to higher issuers’ profits encouraging associations to
raise their interchange fees to promote their network’s product.  Unlike other industries, the card
associations face competitive pressures to increase their fees (see Balto, 2000).  However, if rates
are raised too high, merchants would stop accepting the card and reduce the issuers’ revenue.
Furthermore, the card associations face competition from other proprietary networks.  Discover
negotiates directly with merchants and generally offers lower merchant discounts than either
MasterCard or Visa.  Thus, proprietary networks can provide downward pressure on card
association interchange fees.
The setting of uniform interchange fees at the network level has survived antitrust
scrutiny by the courts.  In 1979, the National Bancard Corporation (NaBanco), one of the first
nonbank merchant credit card processor, sued Visa claiming that the interchange fee should be
                                                                                                                                                                                                   
21 Interchange fees are not limited to credit card networks but exist in ATM and debit card networks.  Prior to the
creation of the Federal Reserve, they also existed for most check transactions.  The Federal Reserve by mandate has
effectively set the interchange at zero.18
zero as was the case for checks.
22  The U.S. District Court of the Southern District of Florida
ruled in favor of Visa’s setting of uniform interchange rates.  The Court found that the motive
behind universally setting interchange was not to fix prices but to provide credit card services
that no single bank could provide on its own.  The alternative of bilaterally negotiating
interchange fees would be too costly and may not yield universal acceptance if acquirers were
not able to negotiate a rate with all issuers.
23
Given today’s marketplace, Balto argues that the interchange fee should either be
bilaterally negotiated or set to zero.  He suggests the following changes in market conditions
since the NaBanco case.  First, improvements in electronic and telecommunication have
significantly lowered processing and fraud costs and laws have been relaxed so issuers can
recover a greater proportion of costs from cardholders.  Second, the interchange fee is no longer
a transfer between banks that serve as both issuers and acquirers.  Third, competition from
payment alternatives is significantly lower today and merchants stand to loose significant
business by refusing to accept them.
However, most economist disagree with Balto’s assessment (Baxter, Carlton and Frankel
1995, McAndrews and Stefanadis 1999, Schmalensee, 2000, and Small and Wright, 2000).  In a
theoretical model, Schmalensee (2000) uses imperfect markets to study the effects of interchange
                                                            
22 NaBanco was competing to handle credit card transaction processing for Carson Pirie Scott, a large Chicago
department store, with First Chicago, an issuer and acquirer at the time.  Because many of the department store’s
customers were also First Chicago’s cardholders, NaBanco claimed that First Chicago had an unfair advantage of
potentially having many on-us transactions resulting in a cross-subsidy from the issuer side to the acquirer side.
Because NaBanco could not cross-subsidize, their processing fees were higher resulting in lost business.  For more
details on the antitrust case, see Balto and Evans and Schmalensee (1999, ch. 11).
23 The Court felt that Visa had proper incentives in place to arrive at the appropriate interchange fee.  Acquirers and
issuers both sat on the Board that determined the fee and raising the fee too high would result in fewer merchants
accepting the card and in less value for all members.  Additionally, the interchange fee was viewed as a transfer
between members that were often both issuers and acquirers.  Therefore, members did not want to raise fees that
they themselves had to pay.  The decision was upheld in the Eleventh Circuit.  In 1986, the U.S. Supreme Court
declined to hear the case.19
fees on credit card network participants.
24  His model demonstrates that the socially optimal
interchange fee is rarely zero.
Merchants have recently protested Visa and MasterCard interchange fee increases (see
Beyer).  However, some merchants are negotiating various deals with issuers in terms of co-
branded products and with acquirers to negotiate better merchant discount rates.  But, given that
rates are set at the network level and merchant discounts are already approaching the interchange
fee, merchants may not easily find lower fees when interchange fees rise.
VII.  The Network
There are two levels of competition in the credit card industry.  One level is at the
downstream market comprised of issuer-consumer and acquirer-merchant relationships.  The
other level of competition is at the network and issuer-acquirer level often referred to as the
upstream market.  As mentioned previously there are four major credit card networks operating
in the United States—American Express, Discover, MasterCard, and Visa.  However,
MasterCard and Visa account for over 75 percent of the market.
While competition among sellers of goods and services generally yields the most efficient
outcome, markets with network externalities may benefit from cooperation among providers of
the underlying service or good.  A network externality exists when the value of a good or service
increases as the number of participants using it increases.
25  In the case of credit cards, the
network externality involves two different sets of participants.  The consumer’s value from the
credit card increases as the number of merchants increases.  Similarly, the merchant’s value from
                                                            
24 He assumes merchants and issuers have some level of market power whereas acquirers operate under perfect
competition.
25 For more on network externalities, see Economedies (1996), Farrell and Soloner (1986), Katz and Shapiro (1985),
McAndrews (1997), Osterberg and Thomson (1998), and White (1996).20
accepting credit cards increases as the number of credit card consumers increases.  Chakravorti
and To find that merchants are willing to pay higher discount fees as the number of illiquid
consumers increases confirming the existence of network externalities in the credit card market.
We will discuss two antitrust cases currently pending against Visa and MasterCard
regarding their alleged anti-competitive business practices.  In one of these cases, the U.S.
Department of Justice (DOJ) charges the two card associations with anti-competitive practices
that harm certain payment system participants and stifle development of new payment
instruments.
26  There are three main issues.
First, DOJ claims that there is significant overlap between members that serve on one
association’s Board of Directors while being members of key committees of the other association
and such overlap prevents competition between the two networks. While members are not
allowed to have representatives on the Board of Directors of both associations simultaneously,
they are allowed to have representatives on an association’s Board while having members on key
committees of the other.  By 1996, 19 banks had representatives on both the Board of Directors
of one association and a committee of the other (USDOJ, January 15, 1999).  DOJ believes that
this relationship has resulted in a lack of competitive advertising and customer choice, as well as
a delay of new products and services.  As a remedy, DOJ suggests that any member with a
representative on one association’s Board of Directors must commit itself entirely to that brand.
Banks without representation on either board could continue to issue both cards.
Visa and MasterCard argue that an overlap in governance leads to better standardization
and reduces research duplication. Visa and MasterCard claim that there have been no
impediments to new product developments, citing smart cards, debit cards, magnetic stripes, and
co-branding as examples.  They deny charges of collusion and point to decreasing prices for both21
consumers and merchants.  The companies believe that this governance structure creates
competition across brands and within the brands, as well as the necessary environment to
formulate standards.   The associations point to the thousands of Visa and MasterCard issuers, as
well as Discover and American Express, from which consumers can choose.
Second, the two card associations allow members to issue both MasterCard and Visa
cards.  Such a policy is often referred to as duality.  DOJ argues that duality has stifled
competition.  It alleges that this structure has created scale economies for the associations and
their members which new entrants are unable to compete with.  Visa points to the Justice
Department’s lack of a clear signal when it asked for a “business review letter” in 1974.
27  Visa
changed By-Law 2.16 requiring both issuers or acquirers of its products to deal exclusively with
them.  This change resulted from an antitrust case brought by Worthen Bank and Trust, located
in Arkansas, that wanted to process both Visa and MasterCard (then Interbank) products while
issuing Visa products.  Because of DOJ’s lack of support for the new exclusivity arrangement
and Visa’s desire not to have ongoing litigation, Visa ceased to fight against duality.
Third, the two associations do not allow member banks to issue cards from other
networks such as American Express and Discover that they deem as a competitive threat.  This
policy is often referred to as exclusivity.  DOJ claims that barring competitors from the primary
credit card distribution system—the banking system—prevents competition.  DOJ believes that
these policies essentially prevent members from considering other networks because they have to
give up their profitable MasterCard and Visa portfolios.
                                                                                                                                                                                                   
26 For an excellent summary of the issues, see McAndrews and Stefanadis.
27 At the time, Visa was known as National BankAmericard, Inc.22
The issue of exclusivity was the subject of the SCFC ILC, Inc. v. Visa U.S.A.
28  Dean
Witter (at the time owned by Sears), issuer of Discover cards, sued Visa for violation of Section
1 of the Sherman Act for not allowing Mountain West Savings and Loan, a small Utah thrift, to
be a Visa member.
29  Visa refused to allow the printing of the cards and Dean Witter sued Visa.
Subsequently, Visa passed By-Law 2.06 stating that membership would be denied if:
… any applicant which is issuing, directly or indirectly, Discover Cards or American
Express cards, or any other cards deemed competitive by the Board of Directors; an
applicant shall be deemed to be issuing such cards if its parent, subsidiary or affiliate
issues such cards. (Evans and Schmalensee, 1999, ch 11 quoting Visa U.S.A., Inc, 1992)
Dean Witter argued that the Visa network, classified as a joint venture, had to give access
to a competitor because it had a large share of the relevant market (72 percent of the charge
volume went over Visa and MasterCard networks at the time).  Furthermore, Visa could not
show that the exclusion was necessary for the efficient operation and therefore must admit any
applicant for membership.
Visa argued that entry by a competitor should only be required if its entry is essential for
competition.  Visa argued that Discover had successfully entered the credit card market and
demonstrated that it did not need to be part of the network.  Furthermore, the forced sharing of
property with competitors would “reduce long-term incentives for the creation of property
through investment and innovation” (Evans and Schmalensee, 1999, 282).  Being part of the
Visa network allowed Discover to gather intelligence on its competitor internally.
The jury found in favor of Discover.  However, in September 1994, the U.S. Tenth
Circuit Court overturned the decision.  The decision was based on a rule-of-reason analysis in
                                                            
28 For more details about this antitrust case, see Carlton and Frankel, Carlton and Salop (1996), and Evans and
Schamalensee (1999, ch. 11),
29 Dean Witter purchased Mountain West from the Resolution Trust Company.  The thrift’s portfolio included a
Visa membership and a small credit card portfolio.  When Mountain West requested the printing of 1.5 million
Prime Option Visa cards, Visa was curious to know why this small thrift wanted so many cards.  Upon investigation,23
which Dean Witter had the burden of proving that consumers would be harmed by By-Law 2.06.
The U.S. Supreme Court declined to hear Dean Witter’s appeal.
In addition to competition among credit card networks, other payment networks such as
debit card and ACH networks also compete for consumer and merchant usage.  While cash and
check are the most popular payment instruments, debit cards are the fastest growing payment
instrument in the United States.  Generally, merchants receive similar benefits from credit and
debit cards.  Most notably, merchants receive good funds in a relatively short amount of time.
However, consumers face different incentives when using their credit or debit cards.  Most
notably, credit cards offer consumers that pay off their balances every month usually at least 20
days of float along with other benefits such as extended warranties and frequent-use awards.
30
An interesting example of such competition is the entry of credit cards into grocery
stores.  As seen in figure 8, both the card associations have set the lowest or second lowest
interchange fees for supermarkets.  McAndrews and Stefanadis suggest that the card associations
were willing to offer lower than usual interchange fees because Point-Of-Sale networks and
Discover had offered substantially lower merchant discounts.  However, McAndrews and
Stefanadis suggest grocery stores may be a special case because consumers may be reluctant to
make purchases on credit.
The other pending antitrust case was filed by a group of retailers against Visa and
MasterCard in 1996.
31  The primary issue is the tying of more than one product.  Specifically, the
card associations do not allow retailers to decline any product with the association’s logo while
accepting others.  The retailers would like to choose which payment products to accept.
                                                                                                                                                                                                   
Visa found out that Dean Witter had bought the thrift and wanted launch its Prime Option Visa from the newly
acquired institution.
30 Recently, offline debit cards have started to offer frequent-usage awards (ATM & Debit News, 2001).24
The retailers object to being forced to accept the offline debit cards offered by Visa and
MasterCard because of the relatively high merchant discount fees being charged compared to
online debit cards.  Research shows that Visa’s offline debit cards are three to five times more
expensive for merchants to accept than online debit cards.
32  Most PIN-based debit card
transactions cost merchants about 10 cents to 12 cents to process.  However, Visa charges
merchants 1.25 percent of the transaction plus 10 cents for their offline debit product.
MasterCard charges 1.36 percent plus 10 cents for each transaction.  Merchants question the
increase in sales associated with accepting offline debit cards, and are unwilling to pay the higher
fees.  They argue that credit cards and debit cards are different products and therefore should not
be included in the card associations’ “honor all cards” rules.  Because few merchants are willing
to stop accepting the credit products, the merchants would like the acceptance of debit cards
uncoupled from the acceptance of credit cards.
The card associations argue that they should be compensated for the use of their network.
The offline debit cards are accepted by merchants that accept credit cards allowing use at a
greater number of merchant locations than online debit cards.  They contend that customers
should not have to disclose how they choose to settle the monetary obligation.  The associations
contend that debit cards are part of the same bundled product offered to consumers, therefore
they view their honor-all-cards rule as appropriate and lawful (Fickenscher and Keenan, 1998).
Antitrust issues are not new to the credit card industry, but improvements in technology
have led to new antitrust challenges as evidenced by the retailers antitrust suit.  The debit card
offers similar features as credit cards to merchants in terms of electronic delivery of funds with
                                                                                                                                                                                                   
31 Wal-Mart, The Limited, National Retail Federation, and the International Mass Retail Association led the group of
retailers, and were joined by Sears and Burlington Coat Factory a year later.25
limited default risk.  However, the underlying incentives for each participant differ between
credit and debit card networks.  These incentives may lead to overuse of credit cards by
convenience users than is socially desirable.  While general equilibrium analysis is extremely
difficult given the number of participants, payment system regulators and the courts should study
the effects on each participant in the credit card network and participants in other competing
payment networks before imposing regulatory changes.
VIII. Conclusion
This article has explored the interrelated bilateral relationships that underlie credit card
transactions.  The pricing decisions between any two credit card participants have effects on
other bilateral relationships downstream and upstream.  The decisions by networks to impose the
no surcharge rule and by issuers to offer certain consumers underpriced services may affect
incentives for usage of other payment instruments.  As evidenced by the various theoretical
models discussed, the effects of pricing decisions on overall welfare depend on the underlying
assumptions.
An important assumption made by most of this literature is that cash is the primary
substitute for credit cards.  However, regardless of whether participants earn rents, welfare may
be improved if a close substitute for credit cards in every respect except the extension of credit is
used by convenience users.  Therefore, online debit cards may improve welfare by lowering the
convenience use of credit cards if incentives are properly aligned.  Online debit cards offer
merchants the same benefits as credit cards in terms of the delivery of good funds via an
electronic network.  If credit and debit cards offer similar benefits to liquid consumers and
                                                                                                                                                                                                   
32 Another difference is that online debit cards immediately debit a consumer’s account whereas offline accounts
debit the consumer’s account a day or two after the transaction but often issuers may memo post the account
immediately.26
merchants, the use of credit cards may not lead to the most efficient outcome given their higher
processing costs.  Unlike the United States, debit card transactions outnumber credit card
transactions in most European countries partly due to greater acceptance of debit cards in Europe
generally.
To investigate such issues, models should incorporate the view that credit cards extend
short-term loans to convenience users.  In the case of convenience users, the cost associated with
the loan is mostly paid by other participants.  Chakravorti and Emmons suggest that revolvers
may be willing to pay this fee.  Others have suggested that merchants pay for this fee.
Alternatively, issuers may be willing to absorb this cost for future revenue from convenience
users that revolve at a later date.
While the outcomes of the two antitrust cases are not known, the cases themselves have
influenced the behavior of some market participants and exposed a very fertile ground for
academic research.  Further research into credit card networks is clearly warranted to better
understand the underlying incentives to each participant.  So far, the literature has been primarily
theoretical.  Empirical investigations are required to observe what market structures exist for
merchants, issuers, acquirers, and credit card networks and which participant, if any, earn rents.27
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Adapted from Evans and Schmalensee, 1993.
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Figure 2: Transaction Costs
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Figure 3: Ten Largest Issuers
By Outstanding Balances, 1999 (in millions)
1. Citibank  $ 73,300
2. Bank One Corp./First USA Bank  $ 69,365
3. MBNA America  $ 65,170
4. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter  $ 37,975
5. The Chase Manhattan Corp.  $ 33,572
6. American Express Centurion Bank  $ 25,196
7. Bank of America  $ 21,483
8. Providian Financial Corp.  $ 19,049
9. Capital One Financial Corp.  $ 18,344
10. FleetBoston Financial Corp.  $ 14,589
Source: Credit Card News (2000), 7.
By Accounts, 1999 (in thousands)
1. Bank One Corp./First USA 64,191
2. Citibank 40,600
3. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter 38,500
4. Capital One Financial Corp. 23,705
5. The Chase Manhattan Corp. 15,592
6. Households Credit Services Inc. 15,030
7. Providian Financial Corp. 12,400
8. Bank of America 12,000
9. Associates National Bank 8,764
10. FleetBoston Financial Corp. 7,237
Source: Credit Card News (2000), 7.34
Figure 4: Quarterly Credit Card Rates and Other Consumer Loan Rates
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Figure 5: Quarterly Credit Card Chargeoff Rates
























Figure 6: Top 10 Merchant Acquirers By Dollar Volume, 1999 (in millions)
1. Chase Manhattan Services $ 150,597
2. National Processing Company $ 115,908
3. Paymentech $ 93,308
4. Nova Information Systems Inc. $ 60,000
5. BA Merchant Services Inc. $ 50,719
6. Fifth Third Bank $ 44,649
7. Concord EFS/EFS National Bank $ 37,200
8. Unified Merchant Services $ 31,600
9. Wells Fargo Bank $ 31,418
10. U.S. Bancorp $ 27,609
     Source: Credit Card News (2000), 17.37
Figure 7: MasterCard and Visa Issuers’ Revenues and American Express Revenues in 1999
Source: Credit Card Management (2001), 11.




















Figure 8: April 1999 Interchange Rates for Consumer Transactions
Visa Interchange Fees
Credit Cards
CPS/Retail-Credit 1.38% + $.05
CPS/Retail 2-Credit (Emerging Markets) 1.43% + $.05
CPS/Hotel and Car Rental 1.58% + $.10
CPS/Card Not Present 1.80% + $.10
CPS/Automated Fuel Dispenser 1.50% + $.05
CPS/Supermarket-Credit         1.20%
CPS/Passenger Transport 1.70% + $.05
Express Payment Service 2.00% + $.02
Electronic Interchange Rate (EIRF) 2.00% + $.10
Retail Key Entry 1.80% + $.10
Standard (paper) 2.30% + $.10
Debit Cards
CPS/Retail-Check Card (signature-based) 1.25% + $.10
CPS/Supermarket-Check Card (signature-based) $.40
New Check Card-Retail (PIN-based) 0.55% + $.10
New Check Card-Supermarket (PIN-based) $.25
Interlink/Supermarket $.15
Interlink/Non-Supermarket 0.45% + $.03
                   Source: Hisey (1999), 106.
MasterCard Interchange Fees
Credit Cards
Merit III 1.36% + $.10
Merit I 1.85% + $.10
Travel Premier 1.58% + $.10
Cardholder Activated 1.50% + $.05
Supermarket        1.15%
Warehouse Club         1.10%
Service Industries 1.15% + $.05
World MasterCard T&E 2.20% + $.10
Key-Entered 1.80% + $.10
Standard (paper) 2.65% + $.10
                   Source: Hisey (1999), 110.39
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